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UNWRAPPING FILE WRAPPER
ESTOPPEL IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A
NEW ECONOMIC POLICY APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
A patent1 is obtained through the prosecution process, during
which an invention is defined by the scope of its allowed claims.2
During prosecution, the Patent and Trademark Office may reject
certain claims based upon the prior art s or formal matters,4 such as
defects in the patent application. This often results in a compro-
mising process of amendment until the patent is eventually
issued.5
Unauthorized use of a patented invention may result in the
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution authorizes Congress to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id. Although the earlier
Articles of Confederation contained no such provision, clause 8 was unanimously adopted at
the Constitutional Convention. BRUCE W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND
CoPYvirHT LAW 1-2 (1967).
2 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-13, 115 (1992). A patent application requires a specification,
claims, and an oath, and may also include a drawing. Id. § 115. More importantly, the speci-
fication must "contain a written description of the invention." Id. In fulfilling the statutory
procedure, the applicant is effectively required to claim the subject matter regarded as his
invention. Id. As a result, the claims essentially delineate the permissible range of protec-
tion for the invention. See RONALD B. HILDRETH, PATENT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 13
(1988). In order to be patentable, the claimed invention must be new, useful, and non-obvi-
ous. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1992). In evaluating the application, the Patent Office consid-
ers each of these requirements. See HILDRETH, supra, at 13.
' See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1992). The statute provides in pertinent part:
A patent may not be obtained... if the differences between the subject mat-
ter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious, at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Id.
' See HILDRETH, supra note 2, at 189. Formal matters might include defects in one or
more parts of the patent application, not related to patentability of the subject matter. Id.
For example, a claim might not sufficiently and distinctly specify the subject matter, as
required by the statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1992).
1 See generally HDRETH, supra note 2, at 30-34. After rejection, the examiner re-
sponds with an office action, stating the reasons for the rejection. Id. at 30. The applicant
may respond with an amendment, and the cycle may be repeated several times. Id. Various
appellate procedures are also available to the applicant. Id. at 32; see also infra note 84
(describing appeals process).
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patentee bringing an infringement action.6 If the allegedly infring-
ing article falls clearly within the language of the patent claims,
there is literal infringement.7 Alternatively, there may be infringe-
ment under the equitable doctrine of equivalents, which precludes
the infringer from pirating inventions by making insignificant
changes to the original invention in order to bring the article
outside the literal scope of the patent claim." However, the coun-
tervailing equitable doctrine of file wrapper estoppel, also known
as prosecution history estoppel,9 forbids an inventor from recap-
turing, through the doctrine of equivalents, claims that were sur-
rendered during the prosecution process in order to obtain the pat-
' See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 281 (1992). In an infringement action, civil liability may be
imposed on "whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within
the United States during the term of the patent therefor." Id. § 271(a).
See Glenn K. Beaton, File Wrapper Estoppel and the Federal Circuit, 68 DENy. U.
L. REv. 283, 283 (1991). Under the United States patent laws, "every element of a claim
must be present in a device for [it] to infringe the claim literally." Id.; see also Fromson v.
Advanced Offset Plate, 720 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting if literal infringement
occurred, doctrine of prosecution history estoppel irrelevant), afl'd in part and rev'd in
part, 755 F.2d 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Kevin R. Casey, Note, Judge Learned Hand Guides
the Federal Circuit: A Model for a Uniform Doctrine of Prosecution History Estoppel, 1985
U. ILL: L. REv. 363, 367 (1985) (stating exact copy would literally infringe patent).
" See Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). In the leading
case of Graver Tank, the Court applied the doctrine of equivalents where the defendant had
made a minor substitution to circumvent the plaintiff's patent. Id. at 609-11. Under the
doctrine, the test for infringement is whether the substituted element performs substan-
tially the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same
result. Id. at 607-08. The doctrine's underlying purpose is to prevent imitations, differing in
minor detail, from transforming the patent protection into a "hollow and useless thing." Id.
at 607; see also Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 684
(Fed. Cir.) (adding hypothetical claim analysis to doctrine of equivalents test), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 992 (1990); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (treating equivalence on element-by-element basis), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
SPErER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 17.07, at 17-41 (1975). Tradition-
ally, the name of the doctrine has been "file wrapper estoppel," after the "file wrapper" in
the Patent Office which contains the record of the prosecution history. Id. The Federal Cir-
cuit, however, employs the term "prosecution history estoppel." Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech
Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 1485 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 924 (1984). File wrapper estop-
pel is one of two limits on the doctrine of equivalents; the other is prior art, i.e., the doctrine
will not encompass an infringing device in the public domain. See ROBERT L. HARMON, PAT-
ENTS AND THE FEDERAL CiRcurr 193 (2d ed. 1991). Recent Federal Circuit decisions indicate
a trend toward limiting the doctrine of equivalents by means other than file wrapper estop-
pel. See id. at 184-86 (discussing more stringent prior art limitation under Wilson Sporting
Goods). It has been argued that the most extreme, liberal views of prosecution history estop-
pel reduce the doctrine to an application of the statutory novelty and obviousness require-
ments and make it the same as the public domain limitation. See Beaton, supra note 7, at
288.
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ent.1° In infringement actions, the prosecution history facilitates
the interpretation of claims, effectively controlling the scope of an
owner's protection."
The Federal Circuit is currently divided over whether the nar-
rowing of claims during prosecution bars all resort to the doctrine
of equivalents. The liberal approach of Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States12 permits resort to the doctrine of equivalents even
where claims have been narrowed, depending on the nature and
purpose of the change.13 Conversely, the strict approach of
Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co.14 assumes that all changes are material
and bars use of the doctrine of equivalents to recapture any por-
tion of a narrowed claim. 15
This Note will discuss three types of prosecution history
10 See Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942). In Exhibit
Supply, the Court stated that the patentee could not "recapture claims which [he] has sur-
rendered by amendment." Id, Later, the Federal Circuit articulated the doctrine as follows:
"The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel precludes a patent owner from obtaining a
claim construction that would resurrect subject matter surrendered during prosecution of
his patent application." Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
1 See HARMON, supra note 9, at 191; see also Kurt F. James, Comment, Patent Claims
and Prosecution History Estoppel in the Federal Circuit, 53 Mo. L. Rav. 497, 499 (1988)
("[Clourts use the prosecution history to interpret the claims of the patent.").
12 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
M See id. The Hughes court stated:
Amendment of claims is a common practice in prosecution of patent applica-
tions. No reason or warrant exists for limiting application of the doctrine of
equivalents to those comparatively few claims allowed exactly as originally filed
and never amended. Amendments may be of different types and may serve differ-
ent functions. Depending on the nature and purpose of an amendment, it may
have a limiting effect within a spectrum ranging from great to small to zero. The
effect may or may not be fatal to application of a range of equivalents broad
enough to encompass a particular accused product. It is not fatal to application of
the doctrine itself.
Id. at 1363.
" 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985).
16 See id. In Kinzenbaw, evidence was offered that the patentee's claim narrowing was
not required to avoid the prior art. Id. at 389. Avoiding a "speculative inquiry," the court
refused to decide whether the original claim would have been allowed if the patentee only
narrowed it enough to avoid the prior art. Id. Instead, the court looked to the potential
reliance of competitors on the file wrapper. Id. The assumption that changes are material is
implicit in the Kinzenbaw analysis. See James, supra note 11, at 502.
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estoppel:' 6 first, classic estoppel, 17 where an inventor narrows a
claim by amendment, cancellation, or addition to avoid a prior art
rejection; second, estoppel by admission, 8 where an inventor or his
agent makes comments to the examiner, effectively narrowing a
claim in order to secure its allowance; and third, non-art estoppel,
where amendments have been made due to rejections for formal
reasons. 9 This Note will then discuss the origins of prosecution
history estoppel, and its further development in the Federal Cir-
cuit. Finally, a recommendation will be presented, based on eco-
nomic policy, to resolve the current Hughes AircraftlKinzenbaw
liberal/strict approach controversy.
I. ORIGIN OF VIEWS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
The seeds of prosecution history estoppel were planted by the
early twentieth-century work of Judge Learned Hand,20 but the
starting point for most modern analyses is the leading Supreme
Court case, Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp.2' While
clearly recognizing the classic prosecution history estoppel ap-
proach, Exhibit Supply sheds little light on the applicability of es-
18 See Carole F. Barrett, Note, The Applicability of the Doctrine of File Wrapper Es-
toppel to Prevent Recapture of Abandoned Patent Claims, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 767, 771
(1980) (discussing three types of prosecution history estoppel treated in this Note); see also
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken Research Corp., 379 F. Supp. 388, 392-93 (D.S.C. 1974)
(proposing two types of estoppel essentially similar to classic and admission estoppel);
Beaton, supra note 7, at 288-94 (defining fact patterns generally corresponding to standard
categories where estoppel typically applied); Casey, supra note 7, at 370-73 (adding reverse
estoppel to other three categories).
"1 See Barrett, supra note 16, at 772. The court, under such circumstances, will not
permit the inventor to later recapture the material surrendered during prosecution. Id.; see
also Casey, supra note 7, at 371 (stating under classic estoppel, patentee asserting infringe-
ment cannot broaden meaning of narrowed claims to recover abandoned matter).
18 See Barrett, supra note 16, at 775-76. While evidence of mere statements was tradi-
tionally excluded under the parol evidence rule, a number of courts have shown a willing-
ness to consider such evidence where arguments or statements provide critical evidence of
claim narrowing. Id.; see also Casey, supra note 7, at 371-72 (noting "[e]stoppel by admis-
sion results from admissions, arguments, and remarks ... [made to] convince the examiner
that the patent claims are distinguishable from the prior art").
19 See Barrett, supra note 16, at 780-86. A patentee may seek to reassert a claim
amended or abandoned for reasons other than a prior art rejection. Id. Courts applying non-
art estoppel reason that competitors should be allowed to rely on the file wrapper regardless
of the reason for a change. Id. at 782; see also Casey, supra note 7, at 372-73 (noting lack of
uniformity in circuit court case law prior to establishment of Federal Circuit).
20 See Casey, supra note 7, at 363 (noting contribution of Judge Learned Hand).
2- 315 U.S. 126 (1942).
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toppel by admission and non-art estoppel.22 Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co. 23 and Graham v. John Deere Cc. 24, in
which the Supreme Court revisited prosecution history estoppel,
provide no further guidance.25 In contrast, the lower federal courts
have been somewhat more precise s.2  The First,27 Third28  and
Fourth29 Circuits, the Court of Claims,3 0 and the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals31 are the only courts that have adopted the
estoppel by admission approach. Aside from limited recognition by
the First Circuit3 2 and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 33
22 Id. at 137. The Court held that narrowing amendments must be regarded as material.
Id. The estoppel issue arose regarding an amendment to a claim for a pinball machine con-
tact switch, submitted in response to a prior art rejection. Id. at 132. Thus, on the facts, the
Court had no occasion to consider estoppel by admission or non-art estoppel. Id.; see also
James, supra note 11, at 506-09 (noting confusion in Supreme Court decisions dealing with
broad versus narrow application of prosecution history estoppel).
23 321 U.S. 275 (1944).
24 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
25 Goodyear, 321 U.S. at 279. In Goodyear, an infringement suit pertaining to dry cell
batteries, the Court rejected the infringer's file wrapper estoppel argument without discus-
sion, recognizing but not further clarifying the doctrine. Id. Graham, a consolidated appeal,
concerned a combination patent on farm equipment and an insecticide sprayer. 383 U.S. at
3, 26. The Court's opinion primarily addressed the non-obviousness requirement of the Pat-
ent Act of 1952. Id. at 1. The farm equipment patentee in Graham cancelled his claims in
response to a prior art rejection and resubmitted them in narrowed form. Id. at 22-23. The
sprayer patentee also cancelled and resubmitted narrowed; claims, in response to both prior
art and formal rejections. Id. at 32. The factual setting therefore permitted consideration of
classic and non-art forms of estoppel. Id. at 22-23, 32. The Court, however, addressed prose-
cution history as a claim construction device. Id. at 33. Discussing the insecticide sprayer,
the Court merely held that the patentee could not assert a broader view of the invention
after the claims were narrowed; it did not specifically state whether this applied to the prior
art or formal rejections, or both. Id. at 33-34. The Graham Court seems to have generally
endorsed the use of prosecution history, but failed to clarify its use in an estoppel context,
particularly with respect to estoppel by admission and non-art estoppel. Id.
28 See Casey, supra note 7, at 370-73, 394-98. This article contains a useful appendix
compiling the leading cases in the federal courts. Id. at 394-98.
21 See Progressive Eng'g, Inc. v. Machinecraft, Inc., 273 F.2d 593, 598 (1st Cir. 1959).
2' See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Hanovia Chem. & Mfg., 179 F.2d 293, 296-97 (3d
Cir. 1949).
29 See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken Research Corp., 444 F. Supp. 648, 778 (D.S.C.
1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1015 (1980).
30 See Lavelle Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 358 F.2d 1005, 1007-08 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
31 See Coleco Indus. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 573 F.2d 1247, 1257-58
(C.C.P.A. 1978).
32 See Borg-Warner Corp. v. Paragon Gear Works, Inc., 355 F.2d 400, 406 (1st Cir.
1965) (embracing non-art estoppel), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 935 (1966). See generally
Casey, supra note 7, at 372-79 (discussing non-uniformity in application of non-art estoppel
doctrine).
22 See Coleco, 573 F.2d at 1258 (endorsing non-art estoppel by implication).
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the non-art estoppel approach has been uniformly rejected. 4
Such inconsistent law-making among the various federal
courts, symptomatic of patent law, led to much confusion and fo-
rum shopping.35 In response, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit was created to harmonize United States patent law.36
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Since its inception, the Federal Circuit has endorsed classic
estoppel3 7 and estoppel by admission,3 8 but rejected non-art estop-
pel.39 Within the doctrines of classic estoppel and estoppel by ad-
mission, however, there is confusion concerning whether a strict or
liberal approach is applicable. In Hughes Aircraft, the Federal Cir-
cuit announced that the doctrine of equivalents might still apply
even where amendments had been made.40 Since most claims are
U See generally Casey, supra note 7, at 395 (summarizing circuit court holdings on
non-art estoppel).
" See generally id. at 363-66 (discussing patent law inconsistency and variation from
circuit to circuit); HARMON, supra note 9, at 495 (noting Federal Circuit was established in
response to inconsistency and forum shopping).
11 HARMON, supra note 9, at 495.
31 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The
Hughes Aircraft court stated: "[t]he estoppel applies to claim amendments to overcome
rejections based on prior art"-a clear endorsement of classic estoppel. Id.; see also Schenk
v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasizing importance of prior art).
3' See Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
In Standard Oil, an attorney's remark in response to a prior art rejection was held to estop
the patentee from later asserting an interpretation contrary to the remarks. Id. at 452-53;
see also Townsend Eng'r Co. v. HiTec Co., 829 F.2d 1086, 1090-91 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (consid-
ering remarks of patentee in upholding application of estoppel). See generally HARMON,
supra note 9, at 195.
" See Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elecs., Inc., 847 F.2d 819, 825 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (rejecting
non-art estoppel), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 927 (1988); see also Mannesmann Demag Corp. v.
Engineered Metal Prods. Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (amendment designed
only to remove indefiniteness rejections will not necessarily create estoppel). See generally
HARMON, supra note 9, at 194-95 (discussing non-art estoppel in Federal Circuit).
40 See Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1363. In Hughes Aircraft, the relevant patent in-
volved a spin-stabilized communications satellite. Id. at 1352-53. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 103, the examiner rejected all of the patentee's continuation-in-part application claims as
unpatentable in view of prior art. Id. at 1354. In response, the patentee cancelled the re-
jected claims and resubmitted new claims, one of which involved:
means disposed on said body for providing an indication to a location external to
said body of the instantaneous spin angle position of said body about said axis
and the orientation of said axis with reference to a fixed external coordinate sys-
tem; . . . and means disposed on said body for receiving from said location con-
trol signals synchronized with said indication; ...
Id. at 1355. The patentee, in accompanying remarks, emphasized that the claims were sub-
mitted to distinguish a prior art reference. Id. at 1355-56. The new claims were allowed. Id.
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amended, to mechanically apply prosecution history estoppel to all
amended claims would essentially gut the doctrine of equivalents.4'
Alternatively, in Kinzenbaw, the Federal Circuit expressly refused
to speculate whether a patentee's claim would have been allowed
had it not been amended. 42 Thus, the court adopted a strict ap-
The infringer was the United States Government, which had employed some satellites
identical to those developed by Hughes, and others that were merely similar. Id. at 1356-57.
The prosecution history estoppel issue arose concerning the similar satellites, which worked
on a store and execute principle. Id. The store and execute spacecraft utilized communica-
tion with an external location to accomplish altitude control, as did Hughes's design. Id.
However, the store and execute spacecraft took advantage of modern technology to perform
some calculations on board the satellite that had previously been performed at the ground
control location. Id.
The lower court, despite the great similarity of the infringing spacecraft and the
Hughes design, refused to find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 1357-
58. In the lower court's view, file wrapper estoppel would allow a finding of infringement
only against those who used obvious and exact equivalents. Id. On appeal, the Federal Cir-
cuit found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents Id. at 1366. Declining to invoke
file wrapper estoppel, the court advised that "[d]epending on the nature and purpose of an
amendment, it may have a limiting effect within a spectrum ranging from great to small to
zero." Id. at 1363.
"' Id. at 1362. The court recognized that a strict application of file wrapper estoppel
would essentially bar all resort to the doctrine of equivalents when a patentee has amended
his claims. Id. The court rejected this approach as a "wooden application of estoppel, negat-
ing entirely the doctrine of equivalents and limiting determination of the infringement issue
to consideration of literal infringement alone." Id.
2 See Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 385 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1004 (1985). In Kinzenbaw, the subject matter of an infringement action was a complex
piece of farm equipment designed to plant seeds and cover them with earth. Id. The court
noted:
Planters cut a furrow in the soil with two round blades called discs. The depth of
the furrow is controlled by two gauge wheels which are connected to the discs, rest
upon the ground, and are located on the outside of the planter. By raising or low-
ering the gauge wheels in relation to the discs, the farmer is able, within limits, to
determine the depth of the furrow.
Id. at 388. Pust, the inventor of one of the devices in which Deere held rights, improved the
row planters by addressing two problems which caused irregularities in the width of the
furrows: soil clinging to the discs, and soil being thrown from them. Id. By locating the
gauge wheels next to the discs, Pust solved the problem. Id.
Pust's initial claim was rejected as obvious in light of prior art. Id. In response, he
narrowed his claim by limiting it, inter alia, to devices where the radius of the wheels was
less than the radius of the discs. Id. In the allegedly infringing device, however, the wheel
radius exceeded the disc radius, precluding literal infringement. Id. at 388-89. Therefore,
Deere sought to establish infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 389. There
was evidence that the size of the wheels was irrelevant in distinguishing prior art. Id. None-
theless, the court declined
to undertake the speculative inquiry whether, if Pust had made only that narrow-
ing limitation in his claim, the examiner nevertheless would have allowed it. The
file on Pust's patent, to which the public had access, explicitly showed that in
response to the examiner's rejection, Pust had narrowed his claims .... Deere
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proach to classic estoppel, in direct conflict with Hughes Aircraft.43
Subsequently, in Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd." and Moeller v.
Ionetics,41 the court returned to the liberal approach, suggesting
that Kinzenbaw should be limited to its specific facts.48 Unfortu-
nately, while the Loctite and Moeller courts proclaimed that equi-
table and policy principles governed the decisions,41 neither court
enunciated those principles, rendering prediction of future applica-
tions most difficult and providing little guidance for later
decisions.48
The most recent Federal Circuit cases on the subject seem to
have perpetuated the confusion. In Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v.
Meccanica Euro Italia SpA,49 the court clearly applied the liberal
approach set forth in Hughes Aircraft, inquiring into both the rea-
sons for and the content of the change 50 Similarly, in Laitram
offers no convincing reason why a competing manufacturer was not justified in
assuming that if he built a planter in which the radius of the wheels was greater
than that of the disc, he would not infringe the Pust patent.
Id. Thus, reliance on the file wrapper is one rationale for the decision in Kinzenbaw. Id.
Attempting to distinguish Graver Tank and Hughes Aircraft, the court explained:
The present case, in which Kinze utilized a characteristic that the inventor specifi-
cally eliminated from his claim, is a far cry from [Graver Tank or Hughes Air-
craft]. Kinze did not endeavor to avoid the Pust patent by making minor immate-
rial changes in what Pust had invented. Instead, Kinze adopted the very element
that Pust had eliminated for the stated purpose of avoiding the examiner's rejec-
tion and obtaining the patent.
Id.
'43 Id.
"' 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
41 794 F.2d 653 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
"' See Moeller, 794 F.2d at 659; Loctite, 781 F.2d at 871 n.7. In Loctite, the court
stated that "[t]he results reached [in Kinzenbaw] only highlight that application of prosecu-
tion history estoppel ... should be performed as a legal matter on a case-by-case basis,
guided by equitable and public policy principles underlying the doctrines involved and by
the facts of the particular case." Id. In response to an accused infringer's reliance on
Kinzenbaw, the Moeller court referred to Kinzenbaw as "limited to its facts." 794 F.2d at
659.
4 See supra note 46.
See Douglas A. Strawbridge et al., Patent Law Developments in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 1986, 36 AM. U. L. R.v. 861, 888-89 (1987).
With regard to the Federal Circuit's failure to articulate equitable and public policy princi-
ples, Strawbridge and his co-authors contend that "[t]he court's continued reluctance to
engage in the task of defining those criteria may be the single largest failing of the court."
Id.
I 9 944 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
50 See id. at 870. In Vaupel, the alleged infringer of a weaving machine patent claimed
that a particular part of the patented device had been added to avoid an obviousness rejec-
tion. Id. Refusing to apply prosecution history estoppel, the court noted that the proper
inquiry focused on both the subject of the change and reasons for it. Id. The court, there-
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Corp. v. NEC Corp.,51 the court held that amendments made dur-
ing reexamination are not substantive as a matter of law, thus fall-
ing squarely in the liberal Hughes Aircraft camp.52 Conversely, in
Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Manufacturing, Inc.,53 the
court clearly stated that the patent holder would not be allowed to
recapture a claim that was limited during prosecution,54 seemingly
more in line with the strict Kinzenbaw approach. Further, in
Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc.,55 the court held that the patent
holder was precluded from showing that the additional claims
made during the prosecution process were unnecessary to over-
come prior art.56 The court stated that this issue was foreclosed
because competitors were entitled to rely on the Patent Office
record.57
One of the more recent Federal Circuit cases, Read Corp. v.
Portec, Inc.,55 seems to follow the liberal Hughes Aircraft ap-
fore, employed the doctrine of equivalents because the change was not made to avoid prior
art. Id.
51 952 F.2d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
52 See id. at 1361. In Laitram, the alleged infringer maintained that where changes are
made in response to a prior art rejection during reexamination, there is a per se prosecution
history estoppel. Id. The court rejected this approach because the particular facts of each
case, such as prosecution history, prior art, etc., must be considered. Id. (citing Hi-Life
Prod. v. American Nat'l Water-Mattress Corp., 842 F.2d 323 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (rejecting per
se prosecution history estoppel for doctrine of equivalents)).
53 962 F.2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
5' See id. at 1036. In Greiner, the invention at issue was a patented neck brace. Id. The
patent holder was unable to apply the doctrine of equivalents because the alleged infringer
had made a substantial improvement, not an inconsequential change. Id. Therefore, it is
submitted that the court's use of prosecution history estoppel was unnecessary in reaching
its decision. Nonetheless, the court's language does seem more in line with the strict
Kinzenbaw approach. Id. Compare id. ("During prosecution, the . . . applicants limited
their claim . . . [They] cannot now capture exclusive rights" to devise extending beyond
limited claims.) with Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (alleged
infringer adopted very element that [patentee] had eliminated "in limiting his claim to ob-
tain the patent"), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985).
as 968 F.2d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub noma., Lemelson v. Mattel, Inc., 1i3
S. Ct. 976 (1993).
aId. at 1207.
57 Id. at 1207-08. The court, responding to the patentee's argument that the added
claims were not needed to overcome the prior art, stated:
Lemelson cannot acquiesce to a rejection and to an agreed alternative, and now
years later shift his stance 180 [degrees] to argue for a second bite at the aban-
doned apple. Other players in the marketplace are entitled to rely on the record
made in the Patent Office in determining the meaning and scope of the patent.
The question ... is thus foreclosed.
Id.
a8 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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proach.5 e In Read, a claim had been added to the patented inven-
tion after a prior art rejection,"0 however, the court found infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents. In so finding, the court
cited Vaupel and refused to apply prosecution history estoppel,
stating that every statement made to distinguish prior art does not
create a separate estoppel.61
Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States International Trade
Commissions2 is the most recent Federal Circuit case discussing
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. The Texas Instru-
ments court cited both Hughes and Kinzenbaw approvingly in es-
topping'3 the holder of a patent for an electronic component en-
capsulation process. 4  The court resurrected the reliance
argument,65 an argument seen most recently in Lemelson and es-
poused by proponents of the strict approach, and used other strict
approach language as well. 6 However, the court recommended, in
a manner reminiscent of Loctite and Moeller, an "examination of
the prosecution history taken as a whole. ' '67 Texas Instruments is
thus significant in that it addresses both lines of authority, and
disappointing in that it fails to resolve the conflict between them,
or to provide any additional guidance.6 8 Significantly, Texas In-
69 Id. at 823-25.
60 Id. at 824. In Read, the patented invention, a portable earth screening device, em-
ployed retracting wheels, which provided stability by allowing the frame to bear directly on
the ground. Id. at 823. The alleged infringer's machine had fixed wheels with a frame that
lowered directly on the ground. Id. The patentee's wheel claim had been added to the pat-
ented invention after a prior art rejection; however, it was submitted with a number of
remarks demonstrating differences from the prior art, of which the wheels were but one. Id.
at 824. The alleged infringer argued that a prosecution history estoppel was created since
the inventor had pointed out that some prior art references did not have retractable wheels,
but acknowledged that the wheels were not the sole basis for patentability. Id. The court
rejected this argument. Id. at 824-25.
61 Id. at 824.
62 988 F.2d 1165 (Fed: Cir. 1993).
63 Id. at 1173-74.
Id. at 1169.
66 Id. at 1174-75.
66 Id. at 1174. The court stated:
Amendment of a claim in light of a prior art reference, however, is not the sine
qua non to establish prosecution history estoppel. Unmistakable assertions made
by the applicant to the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in support of patent-
ability, whether or not required to secure allowance of the claim, also may oper-
ate to preclude the patentee from asserting equivalency between a limitation of
the claim and a substituted structure or process step.
Id. (emphasis added).
6 Texas Instruments, 988 F.2d at 1174.
" See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
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struments confirms the continued vitality of Kinzenbaw, 69 the res-
urrection of which signals the potential for increased use of estop-
pel to limit the doctrine of equivalents. This may be in accord with
recent decisions limiting the doctrine of equivalents by methods
other than prosecution history estoppel. °
Thus, though the majority of the cases follow the Hughes Air-
craft approach, Kinzenbaw has yet to be overruled.7 1 Some subse-
quent cases have suggested that Kinzenbaw be limited to its spe-
cific facts,72 however, the strict view has recently reappeared.73
Accordingly, it seems that two uncertainties remain. First, it is un-
clear whether in any given case the court will throw a judicial
curve ball by applying the Kinzenbaw approach as opposed to the
more generally accepted Hughes Aircraft approach. 4 Second, even
if the Hughes Aircraft standard is applied, it is uncertain upon
which equitable and policy principles the court will rely to deter-
mine the effect of amendments and remarks on the application of
the doctrine of equivalents.7 5 Not surprisingly, the court's inconsis-
tent handling of this issue has provoked a good deal of comment,
although little agreement on a proposed solution.76 An examination
69 Texas Instruments, 988 F.2d at 1174.
70 See supra note 9.
71 See generally Karen G. Binder et al., Area Summary: Patent Decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The Year 1985 in Review, 35 AM.
U. L. REv. 995, 1017-19 (1986) (discussing conflict between Hughes and Kinzenbaw and
subsequent resolution without overruling Kinzenbaw); Donald S. Chisum, Patent Law De-
velopments in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 1991, 41
AM. U. L. REv. 869, 908-09 (1992) (noting Federal Circuit's vacillation between strict and
liberal approaches); Gerald Sobel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A Fifth
Anniversary Look at its Impact on Patent Law and Litigation, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1087,
1110-13 (1988) (noting Federal Circuit's inconsistency and attempted reconciliation of
Hughes and Kinzenbaw).
72 See, e.g., Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding Kinzenbaw
limited to its facts); Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (same).
73 Texas Instruments, 988 F.2d at 1165; Lemelson v. General Mills, 968 F.2d 1202 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
74 See Chisum, supra note 71, at 910.
75 See Strawbridge, supra note 48, at 888.
71 See, e.g., James, supra note 11, at 510 (claiming that Hughes and Kinzenbaw recon-
cilable); JEROME G. LEE ET AL., EQurrABLE DEFENSES IN PATENT CASES § IV (1991) (stating
that Hughes represents prevailing view, and Kinzenbaw is aberration); Sobel, supra note 71,
at 1111-12 (same).
According to other commentators, Hughes and Kinzenbaw both have vitality. See Mar-
tin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Ques-
tions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 673, 681 (1989). Thus, rather than
relying on the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel to limit the doctrine of equivalents,
these authors proposed that the doctrine of equivalents should be abolished. Id. at 729.
19931
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:405
of the underlying policies for prosecution history estoppel may
provide insight into the confused state of the law."
III. POLICY AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
A. Traditional Policy Grounds
Policy justifications for prosecution history estoppel include
contract theory, exhaustion of administrative remedies, conven-
tional estoppel, abandonment and disclaimer, and judicial defer-
ence to the Patent and Trademark Office, among others.78
The use of contract theory as an underlying policy considera-
tion in prosecution history estoppel may be traced to Judge
Learned Hand.7 9 Under this theory, a patent is considered a care-
fully drafted integrated contract, and the parol evidence rule is ap-
plied to limit the use of evidence outside the written embodiment,
such as the prosecution history. 0 Thus, the contract theory gener-
ally supports the liberal Hughes Aircraft standard.81 While com-
mentators are divided concerning the utility of the contract the-
ory,82 most rejections are premised on unconvincing formalistic
reasons.
8 3
According to another, prosecution history estoppel is dead, and the only remaining limita-
tion on the doctrine of equivalents is the doctrine prohibiting equivalent infringing devices
from encompassing the prior art. See Beaton, supra note 7, at 294-95. But see HARMON,
supra note 9, at 194-95 (even liberal Hughes approach only permits, rather than guarantees,
recapture of changes not needed to overcome prior art).
"' See Beaton, supra note 7, at 287-88; Casey, supra note 7, at 382; James, supra note
11, at 513-16.
71 See generally infra notes 79-103 and accompanying text.
" See Casey, supra note 7.
" See Casey, supra note 7, at 384-88; see also Beaton, supra note 7 at 285-88. The
contract is said to be one between the inventor and the people, represented by the Patent
Office. See Casey, supra note 7, at 384-88. But see Beaton, supra note 7, at 286 (criticizing
contract theory).
81 See Beaton, supra note 7, at 284-88; Casey, supra note 7, at 384-88; James, supra
note 11, at 513-16. Judge Learned Hand's treatment of file wrapper estoppel is called a "no
rules" approach, an implicit recognition of its agreement with the flexible, liberal Hughes
approach. Id. at 516 (emphasis in original).
82 See, e.g., Beaton, supra note 7, at 284-88 (opposing contract theory approach); Casey,
supra note 7, at 384-88 (favoring contract theory approach); see also James, supra note 11,
at 516 (suggesting balancing interests of protecting patentee's invention against "danger of
extending that protection beyond the literal language" of claims).
83 See, e.g., Beaton, supra note 7, at 286. This commentator, for instance, argues that
neither the Patent Office nor the inventor receive any consideration. Id. This formalistic
argument, however, seemingly ignores that what is being borrowed from contract theory are
the rules for interpretation of written agreements, not the rules regarding consideration. See
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Under a second policy consideration, exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies, prosecution history estoppel is considered an ap-
propriate doctrine to compel inventors to avail themselves of the
administrative appeal process when patent claims have been re-
jected.8 4 Rather than narrowing the claim, an inventor would ap-
peal the examiner's rejection of the original claim.8 5 However, fail-
ure to resort to the appellate process enjoins an inventor from later
recapturing the surrendered claim through the doctrine of
equivalents.86 Many commentators favor this rationale, which is
more akin to the strict Kinzenbaw approach.87 Given the coexis-
tence of administrative and judicial roles throughout our patent
system,8 however, there seems to be little reason to focus exclu-
sively on resort to administrative remedies.
Conventional estoppel principles address the public's potential
reliance on the file wrapper,89 and the traditional equitable princi-
ple that one may not "take inconsistent positions as circumstances
Casey, supra note 7, at 384-88.
U See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.191, 1.192 (1991). Following a final rejection by the patent exam-
iner, an applicant's appeal proceeds by several steps: notice of appeal and applicant's brief
on appeal, id.; examiner's answer, § 1.193; applicant's reply brief, § 1.193(b); and oral hear-
ing. § 1.194. A decision is then rendered by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.
§ 1.196. Following an adverse decision, the applicant has 60 days to appeal to the Federal
Circuit, or to file a civil action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
§§ 1.301, 1.303.
" See Casey, supra note 7, at 388-90; James, supra note 11, at 514-15.
" See Shepherd v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1886) ("If an applicant, in order to
get his patent, accepts one with a narrower claim than that contained in his original applica-
tion he is bound by it. If dissatisfied with the decision rejecting his application, he should
pursue his remedy by appeal."); see also Casey, supra note 7, at 388-90 (discussing exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies); James, supra note 11, at 514-15 (same).
87 See Beaton, supra note 7, at 284-88; Casey, supra note 7, at 388-90. But see James,
supra note 11, at 514-15 (suggesting that exhaustion of administrative remedies actually
supports "narrow application of prosecution history estoppel," which is equivalent to
Hughes Aircraft approach) (citing 4 D. CHIsUM, PATENTS § 18.05(1) (1987)).
0' See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988). In judicial proceedings, for example, patents are afforded
a "presumption of validity." Id. On the other hand, an alleged infringer may interpose pat-
ent invalidity as a defense, thus allowing for judicial reversal of an administrative decision.
Id.
"s See, e.g., Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (patentee
"offers no convincing reason why a competing manufacturer was not justified in assuming
that if he" relied on file wrapper, he would not infringe), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985);
see also Prodyne Enters., Inc. v Julie Pbmerantz, Inc., 743 F.2d 1581, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
("[W]e decline, as did this court in Kinzenbaw ... ,to undertake the 'speculative inquiry' as
to the necessity of the claim limitations in receiving a patent grant.") (quoting Kinzenbaw,
741 F.2d at 389); Casey, supra note 7, at 382-83 (stating detrimental reliance as requirement
of traditional estoppel theory); James, supra note 11, at 513-14 (same).
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suit him."90 Although many commentators are skeptical about the
claim that accused infringers may detrimentally rely on the prose-
cution history,91 courts routinely cite such reliance as a reason for
applying the strict Kinzenbaw approach.92 The rationale prohibit-
ing inconsistent positions, on the other hand, has been criticized
however by arguments analogous to those used to attack alterna-
tive pleading.93 Nevertheless, a prohibition against a patentee tak-
ing truly inconsistent positions before the Patent Office and the
courts is in accord with justice and the goals of the patent sys-
tem. 4 If potential infringers could review the prosecution history
in light of a legal standard clearly enunciated by the Federal Cir-
cuit to determine the limiting effect, if any, of various statements
or amendments, reliance problems would be alleviated. There-
fore, it is proposed that under the Hughes Aircraft analysis, an
equitable consideration that merits reflection is the degree to
which a party's positions are inconsistent.
In Exhibit Supply, the Supreme Court set forth abandonment
and disclaimer as policy considerations.96 Commentators uniformly
See Beaton, supra note 7, at 284-85.
91 See, e.g., Casey, supra note 7, at 383 (maintaining defendants seldom prove they
suffered injury by relying on material in prosecution history); James, supra note 11, at 513-
14 (suggesting it is difficult to conceive of most potential infringers consulting Patent Office
file wrappers before designing infringing product) (citing Joseph J. Dvorak, That Perplexing
Problem - The Doctrine of File Wrapper Estoppel, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 143, 144 (1968)).
92 See James, supra note 11, at 514; see also Prodyne Enters., Inc. v. Julie Pomerantz,
Inc., 743 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (estopping patentee from broadening claim element
limited during prosecution to cover "a structure which a competitor should reasonably be
entitled to believe is not within the legal boundaries of the patent claims in suit");
Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 389 (using reliance to justify strict approach to prosecution history
estoppel).
92 See Beaton, supra note 7, at 285. According to Beaton, "equitable notions against
taking inconsistent positions do not seem sufficient alone to justify the file wrapper estoppel
rule. It is common in the law to allow a party to take inconsistent positions, such as plead-
ing in the alternative." Id. This criticism seems unwarranted because alternative pleading is
premised on the fact that a party pleads not knowing what a fact-finder will determine on
some preliminary issue, and seeks to preserve his rights should such issue be decided ad-
versely. In patent prosecution and litigation, however, it is submitted that the situation ap-
pears better suited to conventional estoppel applicability.
See James, supra note 11, at 514-15 (citing 4 D. CHiSUM, PATENTs § 18.05(1) (1987)).
Chisum suggests that the prosecution history estoppel inquiry should concern whether the
patentee is seeking to contradict a patent construction that was previously agreed upon by
both the examiner and himself. Id.
11 See Beaton, supra note 7, at 287 (noting reliance argument is circular, but suggesting
public will always look to fie wrapper for other reasons anyway).
96 See Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942) (using abandon-
ment and disclaimer interchangeably to refer to subject matter embraced by "difference"
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disapprove of this theory as it fails to adequately address the in-
tent element of abandonment with respect to the narrowing of a
claim. Finally, at least one commentator has identified judicial
deference to the Patent and Trademark Office as a possible policy
basis for prosecution history estoppel, but it is inconsistent with
judicial application of the doctrine of equivalents.98
Prosecution history estoppel may be viewed as an outgrowth
of one of the fundamental principles of the patent system-an in-
ventor is entitled to his invention, but nothing more. This funda-
mental principle is perhaps one of the most useful policy models
although it may be overly restrictive of the protection afforded in-
ventors. Indeed, to focus exclusively on limiting the inventor
merely begs the question, for the whole purpose of the doctrine of
equivalents is to protect the subject matter of the patent from
non-literal infringement.100 If the sole purpose of prosecution his-
tory estoppel is to limit the doctrine of equivalents, then why not
simply abolish the doctrine of equivalents altogether?'01
It is submitted that the enumerated policy considerations have
some utility in understanding prosecution history estoppel. They
account for the continuing tension between limiting the patentee
to his patent claims via prosecution history estoppel and allowing
resort to the doctrine of equivalents.0 2 These policy models, how-
ever, essentially fail to consider the underlying policies behind pat-
ent law, and the application of prosecution history estoppel which
best serves those policies.10 3 Therefore, to effectively shape the
contours of prosecution history estoppel, the starting point should
between original claim and amended claim); see also Casey, supra note 7, at 382; James,
supra note 11, at 508-09.
See, e.g., Casey, supra note 7, at 382 n.19 (suggesting courts have not adequately
addressed inventor's intent); James, supra note 11, at 514 (noting patentee cannot inten-
tionally abandon equivalent unknown at time of prosecution).
98 See James, supra note 11, at 515-16.
9 See Dvorak, supra note 91, at 150; James, supra note 11, at 515.
100 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). The
Graver court stated "The essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice fraud on a
patent .... [A] patentee may invoke this doctrine to proceed against the [infringer]." Id.
101 See Adelman et al., supra note 76, at 729. This seems to be at odds with compelling
national economic policy considerations that indicate patent protection should be broad-
ened. See infra notes 108-120 and accompanying text (discussing economic reasons for
broad patent protection).
102 See James, supra note 11, at 516.
103 See supra notes 78-103 and accompanying text. Some of the policy considerations
point toward a strict Kinzenbaw approach; some point to a more liberal Hughes Aircraft
approach; and some point in no particular direction.
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be the fundamental economic and philosophical underpinnings of
the patent system.
B. Modern National Economic Policy Grounds
While philosophy and ethics primarily address the existence of
a patent system rather than its form, 04 the underlying economic
basis of the patent system may facilitate determining the appropri-
ate form of estoppel. 105 Classical economists vigorously supported
patent protection.1°8 However, support waned during the twenti-
eth-century ascension of Keynesian economics, which treats tech-
nology as fixed and thus neglects to account for the dynamic ef-
fects of innovation. 07 In the 1950s, growing anti-patent bias was
104 See FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM 27-33 (1956). Philoso-
phers disagree whether a patent system should exist. Id. The pro-patent viewpoint, which
seeks to secure the inventor a just reward for his efforts, is typified by the philosophers of
classic liberalism, such as John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. Id. at 27. Those opposed
tend to see an idea as being a common good belonging to all, a "logical outgrowth of the
social heritage." See WILLIAM B. BENNETT, THE AMERicAN PATENT SYSTEM 61-62 (Kennikat
Press 1972) (1943). A property rights argument can also be advanced in favor of patent
protection. See BUGBEE, supra note 1, at 10. This argument has been traced to Locke's
concepts of property as the reward for industry, id. at 128-29, which doubtlessly influenced
the framers of the Constitution in "securing" the rights of inventors. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8; see also BUGBEE, supra note 1, at 129 (indicating that these rights are of natural law
origin and not created by government).
The anti-patent position is typified by the early views of Thomas Jefferson. See Gra-
ham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1965). Jefferson later became pro-patent, albeit his
position was based on economic and not philosophical considerations. Id. The form of a
patent system, in particular the scope of patent protection, is of interest in this Note. Both
the temporal duration and the breadth of the patent are important in considering its scope,
and therefore its economic significance. See Robert P. Merges et al., On the Complex Eco-
nomics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 839-40 (1990). Although philosophical argu-
ments can be made for limited time patents, philosophy offers little to address issues of
breadth. See BENNETT, supra, at 61-63.
10I See WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 16-17 (1973). In determining
the optimum temporal duration of a patent, economists try to obtain the most favorable
tradeoff between encouraging invention and limiting monopoly. Id. Economic considerations
in determining the breadth element of patent scope are also quite complicated. See Merges
et al., supra note 104, at 840-41.
100 See BENNETT, supra note 104, at 39-40.
107 See generally BENNETT, supra note 104, at 182-98; VAUGHAN, supra note 104, at 286-
318. The typical attitude was that patents were not necessary at all to encourage innovation,
except for tremendous "breakthrough" areas, which would not come from corporations. See
BENNETT, supra note 104, at 185, 193-94. Patents were thought to only have a limited role
for individual inventors. See VAUGHAN, supra note 95, at 317. This may have in part been
due to Keynes's artificial view of the world in which technology was fixed. See WILLIAM
KINGSTON, INNOVATION, CREATIVITY AND LAW 10 (1990). Clearly this view cannot account for
the benefits of innovation flowing from a patent system. See id. (calling Keynes "less rele-
vant to the modern world").
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reflected by judicial hostility towards patents, including expansion
of prosecution history estoppel, among other things.108 Today,
however, the need to strengthen patent laws is widely acknowl-
edged, both as a means of encouraging research and develop-
ment 0 9 and enhancing American competitiveness.110 Indeed, the
earlier anti-patent bias has been identified as one cause of the de-
cline in the international competitiveness of the United States.1
The United States is currently at a disadvantage in competing
for manufacturing jobs with low-wage foreign countries.1 2 One way
to meet this challenge is through invention and innovation,
strengths of the United States free-enterprise system.11 3 If the
United States is to fully exploit its innovative abilities in compet-
ing in a global economy, strong protection for domestic intellectual
property is vital.1 1 4
At the international level, the United States, through its dele-
gation to the World Intellectual Property Organization Committee
of Experts on Patent Harmonization, has suggested worldwide ap-
plication of the doctrine of equivalents and a concomitant use of
prosecution history estoppel to account for changes made in re-
sponse to prior art.115 Due to the continuing judicial role in our
101 See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text; ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 84-87 (1990).
'01 See Alden F. Abbott, Developing a Framework for Intellectual Property Protection
to Advance Innovation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
ECONOIC PERFORMANCE 311, 311-12 (Francis W. Rushing & Carole G. Brown eds., 1990);
Richard P. Rozek, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, supra, at 31, 36; see also KINGSTON, supra note 107, at 158 (suggesting that even
basic scientific discoveries should be protected).
110 See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1981
1 (1981); Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property, Technology and Economic Growth, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 109, at 17, 29; Atul Wad, Intellectual Property,
Technology, Assets & Strategic Choices in the United States, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, supra note 109, at 17, 29; Sobel, supra note 71, at 1090-92.
" See KINGSTON, supra note 107, at 157-58 (discussing Japanese exploitation of Amer-
ican failure to protect critical technologies such as transistor, enabling Japanese to assume
current position of market power).
1212 See Sobel, supra note 71, at 1091 (describing increase in relative value of intangible
technical knowledge as manufacturing moves to low-cost foreign countries).
"I Id. (stressing importance of innovation to growth of United States economy); KING-
STON, supra note 107, at 147-48 (implying results expected in United States free-enterprise
system superior to poor results of government-run research and development).
114 See Abbott, supra note 109, at 323, 326-36 (suggesting possible ways to strengthen
intellectual property protection); Rozek, supra note 109, at 32 (suggesting that such intellec-
tual property protection be strengthened).
, ' See Edward G. Fiorito, WIPO Experts Make Progress on Patent Harmonization
Draft, 41 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1013, at 231, 238 (Jan. 10, 1991). The
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patent system, 16 it is submitted that despite the possible desirabil-
ity of legislative action, the judiciary must necessarily assume its
share of responsibility for strengthening that system. Indeed, the
Federal Circuit was established to revitalize the United States pat-
ent system.1 The strong patent protection needed to encourage
innovation, economic growth and American competitiveness re-
quires a strong doctrine of equivalents to ensure adequate patent
protection for inventors.""" A liberal Hughes Aircraft approach to
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel would ensure that the
doctrine of equivalents has vitality in fact, rather than becoming
inoperative whenever amendments have been made." 9 However,
patent law administration also requires certainty so that market
competitors can make rational decisions in allocating resources to
research, development, and production. 1
20
proposed doctrine of equivalents test incorporates the classic "performs substantially the
same function in substantially the same way and produces substantially the same result"
test, and an alternative equivalent test. Id. The prosecution history estoppel provision states
that "[p]rior representations made by the applicant limiting the scope of the claims shall be
taken into account in determining the extent of protection." Id. at 239. The United States
contingent suggested the following revision, which will be incorporated: "[C]hanges and
modifications made in the claims in response to the citation of prior art shall be taken into
account when determining the extent of protection." Id.
118 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
1 See HARMON, supra note 9, at 495.
18 See Heinz Bardehle, Equivalents and International Patent Law Harmonization, 20
AIPLA Q.J. 120, 125-27 (1992).
Patent attorneys dealing with patent litigation know from experience that a
patent system without equivalents is worthless for inventors and industry. Coun-
tries in which patent infringement suits play a role acknowledge the importance of
equivalents.
... Also to be taken into account is the United States' rightful demand that the
[harmonization] treaty must include important stipulations strengthening paten-
tee's positions ....
Codification and harmonization of the doctrine of equivalents in a harmoniza-
tion treaty would significantly facilitate the preparation and prosecution of patent
infringement suits.... World-wide recognition of equivalence.., would be a great
step toward better enforceability of patents on an international scale.
Id.
119 See Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1362 (rejecting "wooden" application of estoppel
whenever amendments have been made as negating doctrine of equivalents); cf. Fiorito,
supra note 115, at 239 (discussing U.S. delegation's proposed amendment to prosecution
history estoppel provision of Patent Harmonization Draft). It is submitted that the language
used by the U.S. delegation suggests Hughes Aircraft liberal estoppel doctrine because it
states changes and modifications shall be taken into account, not that they have automatic
effects.
110 See Chisum, supra note 71 at 909 (noting Federal Circuit's continued vacillation on
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It is therefore submitted that the Federal Circuit should ex-
pressly overrule Kinzenbaw and its progeny, and adopt the liberal
Hughes Aircraft approach. In so doing, the court must specifically
enumerate the equitable and policy factors that dictate the claim
limiting effect of remarks and amendments. By taking this step the
Federal Circuit would ensure broader patent protection and clarify
the application of prosecution history estoppel, thereby spurring
greater innovation.121 In compiling these policy factors, the court
should draw upon its experience to increase the breadth of patent
protection consistent with statutory law and principles of equitable
conduct, thereby giving greater predictive capability to potential
litigants. First, the court should prohibit patentees from taking
truly inconsistent positions before the Patent Office and judicial
tribunals.122 Second, the court should be more inclined to apply
estoppel where surrender has been quite specific.123 And last, es-
toppel should be applied in appropriate cases in order to prevent
excessive use of the doctrine of equivalents from blocking innova-
tion in pioneer areas, 24 despite the greater range of equivalents
traditionally accorded to pioneer inventions. 125
CONCLUSION
Prosecution history estoppel is a vital doctrine in patent law,
and its underlying policies must be reconsidered in light of the new
importance of patent law to our nation's economic competitive-
ness. The Federal Circuit has clarified some aspects of the doc-
trine, but there are unresolved conflicts between the strict
Kinzenbaw and liberal Hughes Aircraft approaches. The Federal
Circuit should discard Kinzenbaw, a relic of the anti-patent bias of
another day. The court should embrace the liberal Hughes Aircraft
the issue); Strawbridge, supra note 48, at 888-89 (suggesting that failure to define prosecu-
tion history estoppel may be Federal Circuit's greatest failing).
11 See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
22 See James, supra note 11, at 514-15 (citing 4 D. CassuM, PATENTS § 18.05(1) (1987))
(asserting that inquiry should be whether patentee and examiner had mutually held con-
struction of claim that patentee now seeks to change).
123 See HARMON, supra note 9, at 194 n.261 (discussing Kinzenbaw in context of use by
infringer of specific element eliminated from claims by patentee). It is submitted that under
a properly articulated, liberal, Hughes Aircraft rule, the court would be free to apply estop-
pel to the facts of a case like Kinzenbaw.
12, See generally Merges et al, supra note 104, at 860-67, 880-908 (detailing optimum
breadth of patents in different types of industries to prevent "blocking" of significant im-
provements by over-broad construction of pioneer patents).
125 See James, supra note 11, at 498-99.
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approach, which strikes an appropriate balance between the re-
quired rewards for the expensive and lengthy process of innova-
tion, and the extra public costs of monopoly profits. The court,
however, should also enumerate specific balancing factors to pro-
vide greater certainty to the liberal Hughes Aircraft-type analysis.
The resulting increased patent breadth, coupled with greater cer-
tainty for litigants, will boost innovation and enhance American
competitiveness.
Paul J. Otterstedt
